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Abstract
Several countries have recently introduced reforms that aim to increase the neutrality of
their pension system by introducing an incentives-disincentives mechanism or by replacing
their traditional defined-benefit system with a Notional Defined Contribution method. This
paper evaluates the financial effects of an increase in the minimum retirement age in countries
where a Notional Defined Contribution system exists. We show that such a reform produces
a positive effect on the financial situation of the pension system (by generating surpluses
or by reducing deficits) in the short and in the medium run, but it becomes completely
ineffective in the long run. This result implies that in countries where the pension system
is sufficiently neutral such a reform is not appropriate to solve the problem of population
ageing which is a long-run problem.
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1 Introduction
The population ageing problem, observed in most of the industrialized countries, is aggravated
by the reduction in the participation rates of individuals aged 55-64.1 Empirical and theoretical
papers pointed out the negative role that pension plans play on the choice of the retirement age.
Traditional PAYG systems, in which pension benefits are generally not linked to contributions,
create strong incentives for early retirement and, thus, significant distortions in the labor market
(see for example, Burbidge and Robb, 1980; Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1998; Gruber and
Wise, 1998; Kapteyn and de Vos, 1998).
In order to stimulate the labor participation of the 55-64, several countries introduced fi-
nancial incentives and disincentives when the retirement occurs after or before the normal age.
Other countries, like Sweden and Italy, introduced a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC, here-
after) pension system2 which implicitly takes into account this incentives/disincentives mecha-
nism. In particular, NDC systems, that combine actuarial benefit formula with PAYG financing,
allow the system to be more neutral by providing a better link between contributions paid and
pensions earned and by reducing the tax wedge on labor (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003). Thus,
a reform that makes the pension system more neutral would induce individuals to voluntarily
choose to work longer. On the other hand, some countries preferred to increase the minimum
retirement age, implying that some individuals are obliged to postpone retirement. Some coun-
tries such as France, Germany and Italy introduced both a reform that makes the pension
system more neutral and a reform that increases the minimum retirement age. In this paper we
evaluate the effects of the latter kind of reform, i.e. the financial consequences for the pension
system of an increase in the minimum retirement age in an economy where a “neutral” pension
system,3 such as an NDC system, exists.
Several papers analyze the financial sustainability of an NDC system when the pension sys-
tem faces demographic and economic shocks (see Valde´s-Prieto, 2000, Auerbach and Lee, 2009a
and 2009b, Gronchi and Gismondi, 2008). The common result to these analyses is that an
NDC system is in equilibrium in steady state, i.e. if the population is stable and the economy
is stationary, but not in the short run if a shock hits the economy. This implies that, in the
1According to the OECD Labour Force Statistics (2008), the employment rate of the 55-64 decreased in Europe
from 44% to 38% over the period 1980-2000.
2For a review of the main differences between traditional defined-benefits PAYG systems and Notional Defined
Contribution systems, see Bo¨rsch-Supan (2005).
3We write “neutral” in quotation marks since a PAYG system can never be perfectly neutral.
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context of population ageing, the presence of a “neutral” system does not guarantee the financial
equilibrium of the pension system and additional reforms are necessary. For instance, in the
context of a “neutral” pension system, France, Germany and Italy have recently increased the
minimum retirement age. The increase of the minimum retirement age, which is generally justi-
fied on paternalistic grounds in order to guarantee a sufficiently high level of pension benefits,4
contributes to improve the financial situation of the pension system. In the case of a perfectly
non-neutral pension system, it is clear that such a reform produces a permanent and positive
effect for the pension system. As argued by Lindbeck and Persson (2003), raising the effective
retirement age is a powerful way to restore financial stability by simultaneously increasing the
number of workers and decreasing the number of eligible pensioners. Andersen (2012) presents
an OLG model in which pensions are proportional to the current income, implying that the
pension system is perfectly non-neutral. He shows that when population ageing is provoked by
an increase in longevity, in order to guarantee the sustainability of the pension system, it is
more suitable to increase the retirement age. However, in the context of a “neutral” pension
system, raising the pension age has mixed financial effects: in the short run it increases revenues
but, as the individuals contribute for more years, they claim larger pensions a few decades later
(Valde´s-Prieto, 2000). Breyer and Kifmann (2002) analyze the long-run financial implications
of an increase in the retirement age in a system characterized by actuarial adjustments and in
which the contribution rate adjusts in each period in order to guarantee the equilibrium of the
pension system. They consider different levels of the rate of return on contributions and they
find that the long-run level of the contribution rate depends on whether the rate of return on
contributions is greater, equal, or lower than the GDP growth rate. It is important to highlight
that their analysis can be carried out only in the steady state, i.e. when the contribution rate
is constant. In contrast, during the transition phase, the value of pension benefits is clearly af-
fected by the change in the contribution rate, which in turn affects the equilibrium contribution
rate.5
Our analysis differs from that of Breyer and Kifmann (2002) from several aspects. First,
the contribution rate is considered as an exogenous variable implying that the change in the
retirement age produces, for the pension system, surpluses or deficits. Second, we consider a rate
4For instance, in NDC systems, an increase in life expectancy induces a reduction in pension benefits. However,
this reduction can be avoided if individuals voluntarily choose, or if they are constrained by the law, to work
more years.
5For instance, given that the increase in the retirement age allows, in the short run, to reduce the equilibrium
contribution rate, then the generations who pay a lower amount of contributions will earn lower pension benefits.
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of return on contributions exactly equal to the rate of growth of the wage bill since, according
to the Aaron-Samuelson condition,6 even if the population is stable, an NDC system (and more
generally any PAYG system) is financially sustainable only in the case in which the rate of
return on contributions is equal to the rate of growth of the wage bill. Finally, we introduce in
our model mortality and an earning profile, both differentiated by the age of individuals.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a model where an NDC system
exists in an economy that is on its balanced growth path. We first define, in Section 2.1, the
computation rules of pension benefits. Then we show in Section 2.2 that, if the economy is
on its balanced growth path and if the rate of return on contributions is fixed at the rate of
growth of the wage bill, the financial equilibrium of the pension system is guaranteed at each
period, according to the Aaron-Samuelson condition. In Section 2.3, we determine the value of
the increase in pension benefits that is given to individuals who postpone retirement while, in
Section 2.4, we evaluate the effect on the financial situation of the pension system of the increase
in the minimum retirement age by one year. We analytically show that the reform produces a
surplus for the pension system for a given number of years. However, we also prove that the
surpluses generated by the reform fall over time and, after a given number of years, become nil,
implying that the positive effect of the reform is only transitory. The theoretical result presented
in this paper is obtained by assuming that the population is stable and that the economy is a
small-open economy. Both assumptions are necessary to determine an explicit solution. Section
3 presents a numerical analysis in which both hypotheses are removed. Simulation results
confirm that a reform that increases the retirement age is ineffective in the long run.
Finally, some countries have recently introduced a reform that increases the minimum retire-
ment age as a reasonable response to the increase in life expectancy. However, the theoretical
result presented in our paper has an important implication on the effectiveness of this kind
of reform in the presence of a neutral pension system. In fact, in the context of population
ageing, implying that the pension system will produce high deficits in the future decades, our
result suggests that an increase in the minimum retirement age permits to reduce future pension
deficits only in the short run. However, the positive effect decreases over time and, in the long
run (i.e. after 30-35 years), the reform becomes completely ineffective. Consequently, a reform
introduced in the period 2000-2010 becomes ineffective in the period 2035-2045, i.e. when the
population ageing problem will be the most serious for the majority of the European countries.
6Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1958).
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2 The model
Consider a small-open economy in which a representative firm produces one good using a stan-
dard Cobb-Douglas technology, Yt = K
α
t · L1−αt , where Yt indicates real GDP, Kt the stock of
capital available in the economy, and Lt the number of units of effective labor. First order con-
ditions for profit maximization require that wt = (1−α) · (Kt/Lt)α and rt+ δ = α · (Kt/Lt)α−1.
The small-open-economy assumption implies that the rate of remuneration of capital is exoge-
nously fixed at the world level (rt = r). Consequently, capital flows adjust in order to keep
constant the capital per unit of effective labor (Kt/Lt = k). Thus, the wage per unit of effective
labor is also constant (wt = w).
In this economy all individuals start working at age S + 1, work N years until age S + N
and earn pensions benefits starting from age S+N + 1. We assume that individuals cannot live
more than age S + N + X, where X represents the maximum number of years during which
retirees can earn pension benefits. We suppose that the population growth rate is constant and
equal to n and that the survival probabilities, differentiated by age, remain constant over time.
This implies that the population is stable, i.e. the old-age dependency ratio and the population
structure remain constant over time. The unconditional probability to be alive at age S + i is
indicated by γS+i, with γS = 1. The number of individuals aged S + i at time t + k is equal
to γS+i · (1 + n)k−i, implying that the number of individuals aged S at time t is normalized to
unity.
The wage earned by an individual, expressed in real terms, is given by the product between
the wage per unit of effective labor (w) and a term measuring the individual productivity. In
particular, the productivity level of an individual aged S+i at time t+k is given by the product
between a term representing the wage profile by age, noted ηS+i, and a term representing the
technological level, noted At+k. The earning profile by age is supposed to remain constant over
time, while technology is assumed to grow at a constant and exogenous rate g. The real wage
earned by an individual aged S + i at time t+ k is then equal to ηS+i ·At+k · w.
Moreover, in the economy there exists an NDC pension system in which pension benefits
are computed according to specific rules, described hereafter, that guarantee the equilibrium of
the pension system in each period.
Given all these hypotheses, our economy is on its balanced growth path.
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2.1 The computation of pension benefits in an NDC system
Consider an individual who starts working at age S+1 at time t−N+1 and stops working at age
S+N at time t. Consequently, the individual begins to pay contributions when aged S+1 until
when aged S+N , the amount of which are respectively τ ·ηS+1 ·At−N+1 ·w and τ ·ηS+N ·At ·w,
where τ represents the social contribution rate. The individual begins to earn pension benefits
when aged S + N + 1 at time t + 1 (PS+N+1,t+1) until when aged S + N + X at time t + X
(PS+N+X,t+X). Pension benefits are supposed to be indexed on the basis of inflation implying
that pension benefits, in real terms, remain constant over time: PS+N+1,t+1 = PS+N+k,t+k, with
k = 1, ..., X.7
In an NDC system, pension benefits are perfectly related to contributions paid. In particular,
in our model, pension benefits that the individual earns at age S + N + 1 at time t + 1 are
computed such that the expected present value of pension benefits is equal to the expected
capitalized value of contributions:
N∑
i=1
τ · ηS+i ·At+i−N · w · (1 +R)N−i · γS+i = PS+N+1,t+1 ·
N+X∑
i=N+1
(1 +R)N−i · γS+i (1)
or, equivalently, by dividing both sides by γS+N+1:
N∑
i=1
τ · ηS+i ·At+i−N · w · (1 +R)N−i · γS+i
γS+N+1
= PS+N+1,t+1 ·
N+X∑
i=N+1
(1 +R)N−i · γS+i
γS+N+1
(2)
In the previous expressions, we use a rate of return R both to actualize the pension benefits
flows and to capitalize the contributions flows. Thus, R represents the rate of return on con-
tributions that the pension system guarantees to all generations over time and to individuals
belonging to the same generation, independently of the retirement age. This particular com-
putation rule of pension benefits guarantees the quasi fairness and the quasi neutrality of the
pension system, as shown respectively at the end of Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
The RHS of equation 2 indicates that future (and, given the indexation rule, constant)
pension benefits are discounted at the rate R and multiplied by the term γS+i/γS+N+1, which
represents the probability to be alive at age S+ i conditional on being alive at age S+N+1. As
7Another possibility is to index pension benefits on the basis of the wage growth rate. This would imply that
the replacement ratio (the ratio between the first pension and the last wage) is lower than in the case considered
in our paper while the purchasing power of retirees with respect to that of workers remains constant over time.
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shown in the LHS of equation 2, contributions paid at each date are capitalized at the rate R and
multiplied by the term γS+i/γN+1. This latter term represents the inverse of the probability to
be alive at age S+N + 1 conditional of being alive at age S+ i. This computational rule allows
to take into account the probability that the individual dies before the retirement age. If the
individual dies before retiring, all the contributions are lost by the contributor and transferred
to the surviving individuals of the same cohort. This mechanism is similar to the insurance
mechanism a` la Yaari (1965), where surviving individuals obtain a remuneration rate higher
than the market interest rate.8
Given that the technology grows at the rate g (so At+i−N = At(1+g)N−i ) and that pension
benefits remain constant over time, the first pension is computed as follows:
PS+N+1,t+1 =
τ ·∑Ni=1 (1+R1+g )N−i · ηS+i · γS+i∑N+X
i=N+1 (1 +R)
N−i · γS+i
·At · w (3)
Equation 3 implies that the replacement ratio depends positively on the social contribution
rate τ and the rate of return R, and negatively on the survival probabilities γ.
We analyze next the condition on the rate of return R that guarantees the equilibrium of
the pension system in an economy that is on its balanced growth path.
2.2 The financial equilibrium of an NDC system in a stationary economy
In order to analyze the financial situation of the pension system, we consider the contributions
paid by all workers and the pension benefits earned by all retirees at each year. In what follows,
we assume that all individuals work until age S +N and receive pension benefits starting from
age S + N + 1. Thus, S + N + 1 represents the minimum retirement age fixed by the NDC
system.
The financial situation is analyzed at time t+1, i.e. the date when the individual considered
in the previous section earns his first pension. As mentioned previously in the text, the number
of individuals aged S + i at time t + k is equal to γS+i · (1 + n)k−i. Thus, at time t + 1, the
number of workers is equal to
∑N
i=1 γS+i · (1 + n)1−i and the number of retirees is equal to∑N+X
i=N+1 γS+i · (1 + n)1−i.
8However, other options are available to treat the issue of the death before the retirement age: (i) to allocate
survivor benefits to young survivors; (ii) to create a reserve fund that the pension system can use later to cover
future deficits.
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Proposition 1. In an economy that is on its balanced growth path, if the rate of return
on contributions is fixed at the rate of growth of the wage bill, i.e. 1 +R = (1 +n) · (1 + g), and
pension benefits are computed following the rule indicated in equations 1-3, then, according to
the Aaron-Samuelson condition, the NDC system is in equilibrium at each period.
Proof. We first determine the total value of contributions paid by all workers and the total
value of pension benefits received by all retirees.
At time t+ 1, the total contributions paid by all workers are equal to
∑N
i=1 τ · ηS+i ·At+1 ·
w · γS+i · (1 + n)1−i.
The total pensions received by all retirees at time t + 1 are given by
∑N+X
i=N+1 PS+i,t+1 ·
γS+i · (1 + n)1−i. Given the indexation rule on the basis of inflation, pension benefits earned
by one individual remain constant in real terms over the entire pension period. However,
considering that productivity grows at the constant rate g, pension benefits grow at the rate g
from one generation to another. Thus, at time t+ 1, pension benefits earned by a retiree aged
S + i > S +N + 1 can be expressed in terms of the pension earned by a retiree aged S +N + 1
who retires at time t+ 1 as follows: PS+i,t+1 =
PS+N+1,t+1
(1+g)i−N−1 , with i ≥ N + 1. The total pensions
paid at time t+ 1 are then given by PS+N+1,t+1 ·
∑N+X
i=N+1
γS+i·(1+n)1−i
(1+g)i−N−1 .
For the pension system, the difference between revenues and expenditures at time t+ 1 is:
N∑
i=1
τ · ηS+i ·At+1 · w · γS+i · (1 + n)1−i − PS+N+1,t+1 ·
N+X∑
i=N+1
γS+i · (1 + n)1−i
(1 + g)i−N−1
Using equation 3 and considering that At+1 = At · (1 + g), we find:
τ ·At · (1 + g) · w ·
N∑
i=1
ηS+i · γS+i · (1 + n)1−i
−
τ ·∑Ni=1 (1+R1+g )N−i · ηS+i · γS+i∑N+X
i=N+1 (1 +R)
N−i · γS+i
·At · w ·
N+X∑
i=N+1
γS+i · (1 + n)1−i
(1 + g)i−N−1
By fixing R such that 1 +R = (1 + g) · (1 + n), we obtain:
τ ·At · (1 + g) · w · (1 + n) ·
{
N∑
i=1
(1 + n)−i · ηS+i · γS+i −
N∑
i=1
(1 + n)−i · ηS+i · γS+i
}
= 0
Q.E.D.
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In Section 2.1 we said that the computation rules presented in equations 1 and 2 guarantee
the quasi fairness of the pension system. Actuarial fairness can be defined as a situation in which
the present value of lifetime contributions equals the present value of lifetime benefits where
the rate of return used is the riskless interest rate (see, for example, Queisser and Whitehouse,
2006, and Disney, 1999). This implies that an NDC system (and, in general, any PAYG system)
is actuarially fair only if the rate of return on contributions is equal to the market interest rate.
However, Proposition 1 implies that in this case the system is not financially sustainable since,
even in an economy that is on its balanced growth path, the pension system would generate
deficits at each period. Thus, an NDC system (and, in general, any PAYG system), can never
be perfectly actuarially fair9 but, at the best, following the definition by Lindbeck and Persson
(2003), “quasi actuarial”.
2.3 The effect of an increase in the minimum retirement age on the value of
pension benefits in an NDC system
Consider now a one-year increase in the minimum retirement age. Thus, our individual has
to work until age S + N + 1 at time t + 1 and earns his first pension when aged S + N + 2
at time t + 2. We now compute the new value of pension benefits, noted PS+N+2,t+2, such
that the expected present value of pension benefits is equal to the expected capitalized value of
contributions:
N+1∑
i=1
τ · ηS+i ·At+i−N · w · (1 +R)N+1−i · γS+i = PS+N+2,t+2 ·
N+X∑
i=N+2
(1 +R)N+1−i · γS+i (4)
The postponement of the retirement age by one year induces an increase ∆Pt+2 in pension
benefits at date t+ 2 as follows:10
∆Pt+2 =
τ · ηS+N+1 ·At+1 · w · γS+N+1 + PS+N+1,t+1 · γS+N+1∑N+X
i=N+2(1 +R)
N+1−i · γS+i
(5)
9The only exception is represented by the case in which the golden rule is verified, implying that the interest
rate equals the GDP growth rate.
10Computational details can be found in Appendix 1.
9
Equation 5 can be rewritten as follows:
∆Pt+2 ·
N+X∑
i=N+2
(1 +R)N+2−i · γS+i
γS+N+2
= (τ · ηS+N+1 ·At+1 · w + PS+N+1,t+1) · (1 +R) · γS+N+1
γS+N+2
(6)
The previous expression indicates that if pension benefits are computed such that the ex-
pected capitalized value of contributions is equal to the expected present value of pension ben-
efits, the increase in pension benefits that must be given to an individual who works one more
year is computed as follows: the expected present value of all the future increases (computed
at time t+ 2 and weighted by the probability to be alive at age S + i conditional on being alive
at age S +N + 2) must be equal to the additional contributions paid plus the pension benefits
lost, capitalized at the rate R, and taking into account the probability to survive between age
S +N + 1 and S +N + 2. This rule guarantees the quasi neutrality of the pension system.
The definition of neutrality given here is similar to that given by Blo¨ndal and Scarpetta
(1999) and Queisser and Whitehouse (2006). In particular, Blo¨ndal and Scarpetta (1999) define
a neutral system as a system in which the pension wealth of an individual at a given age,
computed as the difference between the discounted value of expected pension benefits and the
discounted value of contributions, is independent of the retirement age. According to Queisser
and Whitehouse (2006) a pension system is actuarially neutral if the pension wealth for retiring
a year later is the same as the pension wealth when retiring today plus whatever pension
is accrued during the additional year of work. Thus, a system is neutral when the increase
in pension benefits is exactly offset by the higher cost in terms of contributions and foregone
pensions at all ages (Blo¨ndal and Scarpetta, 1999), implying that the system does not distort the
retirement decision. In order to guarantee the actuarial neutrality of the system, the additional
contributions paid and the pension benefits lost must then be equal to the present value of all the
future increases in pension benefits computed using the riskless interest rate. In contrast, in our
paper, the increase in pension benefits, determined from equation 4, is computed using the rate
of growth of the wage bill otherwise the pension system is not sustainable, even in an economy
that is on its balanced growth path. Consequently, an NDC system, and in general any PAYG
system, can never be perfectly neutral but, at the best, “quasi neutral”. The computation rules
considered in our model guarantee the “quasi neutrality” of the pension system in the sense that
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all the individuals belonging to the same generation receive the same treatment independently
of the retirement age, i.e. the same rate of return on contributions, implying that no individual
receives a better treatment and no individual is penalized. Finally, it is important to note that
the rate of return on contributions is in general lower than the riskless interest rate, implying
that the increase in the first pension in an NDC system is lower than in a perfectly neutral
system. In contrast, in a perfectly non-neutral system, the increase in the first pension is nil.
2.4 The effect of the reform on the NDC pension system
The aim of our paper is to evaluate the effect of the increase in the minimum retirement age in
an economy where an NDC system exists. In the previous section we computed the value of the
increase in pension benefits that must be given to individuals who postpone retirement by one
year in an NDC system. Now we evaluate the financial effects of this reform on the financial
situation of the pension system.
Suppose that a reform that increases the retirement age by one year is introduced in t+ 1.
This reform implies that all individuals aged S +N at date t+ 1 have to work one more year.
Therefore, at date t+ 1, the reform produces a positive gain for the pension system represented
by (i) the supplementary contributions paid by the γS+N+1 · (1 +n)−N workers aged S +N + 1
at date t+1 and (ii) the pension benefits lost by the same individuals. The gain for the pension
system is then equal to γS+N+1 · (1 + n)−N · (τ · ηS+N+1 ·At+1 · w + PS+N+1,t+1).
At time t+ 2, the gain for the pension system is related to the fact that γS+N+1 · (1 +n)1−N
individuals pay one more year of contributions and do not receive pension benefits. This gain
is partially compensated by the fact that γS+N+2 · (1 + n)−N individuals (the ones who in t+ 1
worked one more year and who are still alive in t+2) earn a greater amount of pension benefits.
The net surplus for the pension system is then equal to γS+N+1 · (1 +n)1−N · (τ · ηS+N+1 ·At+2 ·
w + PS+N+1,t+2)− γS+N+2 · (1 + n)−N ·∆Pt+2.
At time t+ 3, the gain for the pension system is related to the fact that γS+N+1 · (1 +n)2−N
individuals pay one more year of contributions and do not receive pension benefits. This gain
is partially compensated by the fact that γS+N+3 · (1 + n)−N individuals (the ones who at date
t + 1 worked one more year and who are still alive at time t + 3) and γS+N+2 · (1 + n)1−N
individuals (the ones who at date t + 2 worked one more year and who are still alive at date
t+ 3) earn a greater amount of pension benefits. The net surplus for the pension system is then
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equal to γS+N+1 · (1+n)2−N · (τ ·ηS+N+1 ·At+3 ·w+PS+N+1,t+3)−γS+N+3 · (1+n)−N ·∆Pt+2−
γS+N+2 · (1 + n)1−N ·∆Pt+3.
More in general, at time t + k, the gain for the pension system is related to the fact that
γS+N+1 ·(1+n)k−N−1 individuals pay one more year of contributions and do not receive pension
benefits. Moreover, γS+N+2 · (1 + n)k−N−2 individuals (the ones who in t + k − 1 worked one
more year and who are still alive in t + k), γS+N+3 · (1 + n)k−N−3 individuals (the ones who
in t+ k − 2 worked one more year and who are still alive in t+ k),..., and γS+N+k · (1 + n)−N
individuals (the ones who in t+ 1 worked one more year and who are still alive at t+ k) earn a
greater amount of pension benefits.
Proposition 2. In an economy that is on its balanced growth path and where an NDC
system exists, a reform that increases the minimum retirement age by one year produces positive
surpluses for the pension system during X periods, i.e. the maximum number of years in which
retires can earn pension benefits. After X periods, the net surplus is nil implying that the reform
becomes completely ineffective.
Proof. The net surplus for the pension system at time t+ k, noted Surplt+k, is equal to:
Surplt+k = γS+N+1 · (1 + n)k−N−1 · (τ · ηS+N+1 ·At+k · w + PS+N+1,t+k)
−
N+k≤N+X∑
i=N+2
γS+i · (1 + n)k−i ·∆Pt+2+k−i+N (7)
where the sum in the RHS of equation 7 takes into account that, given the increase in the
minimum retirement age, there cannot be more than X − 1 generations of retirees at the same
date.
Given that the economy is on its balanced growth path and that productivity grows at the
constant rate g, we have that: (i) At+k = At+1 · (1 + g)k−1, (ii) PS+N+1,t+k = PS+N+1,t+1 · (1 +
g)k−1, (iii) ∆Pt+2+k−i+N = ∆Pt+2 · (1 + g)k−i+N . Thus:
Surplt+k = γS+N+1 · (1 + n)k−N−1 · (1 + g)k−1 · (τ · ηS+N+1 ·At+1 · w + PS+N+1,t+1)
− ∆Pt+2 · (1 +R)k−N−1 · (1 + g)N ·
N+k≤N+X∑
i=N+2
(1 +R)N+1−i · γS+i
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Given that ∆Pt+2 =
τ ·ηS+N+1·At+1·w·γS+N+1+PS+N+1,t+1·γS+N+1∑N+X
i=N+2(1+R)
N+1−i·γS+i
(see equation 5), the net sur-
plus at date t+ k related to a one-year increase in the minimum retirement age is given by:
Surplt+k = γS+N+1 · (1 +R)k−N−1 · (1 + g)N · (τ · ηS+N+1 ·At+1 · w + PS+N+1,t+1)
·
(
1−
∑N+k≤N+X
i=N+2 (1 +R)
N+1−i · γS+i∑N+X
i=N+2(1 +R)
N+1−i · γS+i
)
(8)
Equation 8 implies that:
i) If k < X, i.e. before date t+X, the net surplus is positive.
ii) If k ≥ X, i.e. starting from date t+X, the net surplus is nil.
Q.E.D.
Our analysis can be generalized by assuming that individuals are free to choose the retire-
ment age. Thus, for a given cohort, one fraction of individuals decides to retire at the minimum
retirement age, another fraction of individuals decides to retire one year later, and so on. As-
suming that these fractions remain constant over time, the theoretical result of our paper still
holds.11
3 A simulation exercise
In this section, we numerically evaluate the financial effects of an increase in the minimum
retirement age. The numerical analysis allows to quantify the effects of the reform in the case
in which we remove some assumptions made in the theoretical model, i.e. that the population
is stable and that the economy is a small-open economy. The numerical analysis is carried out
using a simple OLG model of the type Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) where several generations
coexist at each period. In what follows, we present a brief description of the model.
3.1 Consumers
For each generation, we assume the existence of a representative agent who has to decide the
intertemporal profile of consumption by maximizing his intertemporal utility subject to an
intertemporal budget constraint. All individuals work 41 years, between 20 and 60 years old,
11This generalization is not presented in the paper since it would extremely complicate the notation. The
demonstration is available from the author upon request.
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and are retired starting from age 61 until age 95. This implies that, with the notation used in
our theoretical model, S + 1 = 20, N = 41, and X = 35. The intertemporal utility function is:
U =
95∑
j=20
(
1
1 + ρ
)j−20
· ln cj,t+j−20 · γj,t+j−20
where cj,t is consumption, ρ is the intertemporal preference rate and γj,t is the unconditional
probability to be alive at age j at time t.
In order to avoid the presence of involuntary bequests, we assume the existence of a life
insurance sector, where the actuarial rate of interest exceeds the market rate of interest by
the conditional mortality probability (Yaari, 1965). Individuals accumulate capital over time
and, in the last period, they consume all the accumulated capital. The evolution of capital is
described by the following equation:
kj+1,t+1 = kj,t · (1 + rt) + (1− ωj,t) · kj+1,t+1
+ (1− τ − τLt ) · ηj ·At · wt + Pj,t − cj,t
where kj,t is the capital that an individual aged j owns at time t, rt is the real interest rate,
ωj,t is the survival probability for an individual belonging to the class age j at time t, τ is the
social contribution rate, τLt is the tax rate applied to labor incomes, ηj · At · wt is the gross
wage earned by an individual aged j at time t, and Pj,t represents pension benefits which are
computed using equation 1.
The Euler equation describing the optimal evolution of consumption is:
cj+1,t+1
cj,t
=
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
The demographic evolution is described by the following equations:
Popj+1,t+1 = Popj,t · ωj,t
Pop20,t+1 = Pop20,t · (1 + nt)
where Popj,t is the number of individuals aged j at time t, nt is a measure of the fertility rate
at time t and ωj,t is the survival probability for an individual belonging to the class age j at
time t. Fertility rates and survival probabilities can vary over time.
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3.2 Firms
We assume that a representative firm produces one good using labor and capital according to
a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = K
α
t · L1−αt
where Yt represents real GDP, Kt the quantity of capital employed, and Lt the quantity of labor
employed expressed in effective labor units. The demand of labor and capital is determined in
order to maximize profits. First order conditions for profit maximization are wt = (1 − α) ·
(Kt/Lt)
α and rt + δ = α · (Kt/Lt)α−1.
3.3 The pension system and the public sector
The surplus of the pension system is given by the difference between the contributions earned
and the pensions paid:
Surplt =
∑
j
τ · ηj ·At · wt · Popj,t −
∑
j
Pj,t · Popj,t
The public surplus, which includes the pension surplus, is fixed to zero for each period.
A tax on labor incomes (τLt ) is endogenously determined in order to respect this government
budget constraint.
3.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions in the market of goods, in the capital market and in the labor market
are:
Yt =
∑
j
cj,t · Popj,t + It +NXt
Kt =
∑
j
kj,t · Popj,t +KRoWt
Lt =
∑
j
ηj ·At · Popj,t
where It represents investments, NXt net exports and K
RoW
t the stock of capital owned by
foreign residents.
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3.5 Model calibration
The productivity growth rate g is fixed at 1.5%. The parameter α is 1/3. The population
growth rate n is fixed at 0.5%. The survival probabilities, differentiated by age, are supposed
to remain constant over time.12 The earning profile by age is constant and generated using the
following quadratic function ηj = e
0.08·(j−S−1)−0.0012·(j−S−1)2 . The social contribution rate τ is
fixed at 22.5%. The parameter ρ, determined from the Euler equation in order to calibrate the
model in steady state, is equal to 0.012. The rate of return on contributions R used to compute
pension benefits in the NDC system is R = (1 + n) · (1 + g)− 1 = 2.0075%.
Given these hypotheses, the population is stable and the economy is on its balanced growth
path. In particular, the old-age dependency ratio, computed as the ratio between the number
of people aged more than 60 and the number of people aged 20-60, remains constant over time
and is equal to 0.3. The replacement ratio remains constant over time and is equal to 50.3% of
the last gross wage. The ratio between the total pension expenditure and GDP is equal to 15%
and the pension system is in equilibrium at each period. This implies that if pension benefits
are computed according to equation 1, then the financial sustainability of the pension system
is guaranteed in an economy that is on its balanced growth path, as asserted in Proposition 1
and according to the Aaron-Samuelson condition.
3.6 Simulation results
Here we simulate the effects of a reform that increases the retirement age by one year. The
reform is assumed to be unexpected and is introduced at date t = 41. We consider four scenarios.
In the first scenario, we assume that the economy is a small-open economy. This is exactly the
same situation analyzed in the theoretical model in the first part of the paper. In this case, the
interest rate is fixed at an exogenous level, while international capital flows are endogenously
determined in order to keep the capital per unit of effective labor constant. In the second
scenario, we assume that the economy is closed. In this case, international capital flows are set
to zero, while the interest rate is endogenously determined in order to clear the domestic capital
market. In the third scenario, we assume again that the economy is a small-open economy and,
in addition, that population is ageing due to a reduction in fertility rates and an increase in
longevity. In the last scenario, we assume that the economy is closed and that population is
12Survival probabilities are fixed at the level provided by Eurostat for the European Union (28 countries) in
2010.
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ageing as in the third scenario.13
Figure 1 in Appendix 2 shows the evolution of the ratio between the surplus of the pension
system and real GDP in the first two scenarios, i.e. in the case of an increase in the minimum
retirement age by one year, in an open economy (Scenario 1) and in a closed economy (Scenario
2), and by considering a stable population. The results are qualitatively identical and quan-
titatively very similar. In the first year in which individuals have to work one more year, the
reform generates a net surplus for the pension system that represents 1.3% of GDP in Scenario
1 and 1.2% in Scenario 2. After date t = 41, the ratio between the surplus of the pension
system and real GDP reduces over time in both scenarios. In particular, in Scenario 1, this
ratio becomes equal to zero at date t = 75, i.e. 35 years after the introduction of the reform.
Note that 35 years represents the maximum number of years in which retirees can earn pension
benefits (since, in our numerical example, individuals earn pension benefits starting from age 61
until age 95) and thus corresponds to the variable X in the theoretical model. This numerical
result, in an open economy, is exactly identical to the theoretical result asserted in Proposition
2. In scenario 2, in which we consider the closed-economy assumption, the result is qualitatively
identical, implying that the reform becomes completely ineffective in the long run.
Figure 2 in Appendix 2 shows the evolution of the ratio between the surplus of the pension
system and real GDP in the third scenario, i.e. in the case of an increase in the minimum
retirement age by one year, in an open economy and by considering an ageing population.
Population ageing is simulated by assuming a simultaneous reduction in fertility rates and
an increase in longevity. The simulated old-age dependency ratio, represented in figure 4 in
Appendix 2, is similar to that projected for Europe.14 Scenario 3 is compared with a scenario in
which we only simulate the effects of population ageing, i.e. without increasing retirement age.
The latter scenario shows that, accordingly to the theoretical result of Gronchi and Gismondi
(2008), population ageing produces important deficits implying that an NDC system is not
13Other interesting extensions of the model, that are not presented in the paper, concern the endogeneity
of fertility and the introduction of the consumption/leisure decision. In the context of population ageing, the
endogeneity of the fertility rate is clearly an important issue. However, considering that (i) an increase in the
minimum retirement age positively affects the present value of lifetime incomes and (ii) that, empirically, per
capital GDP and fertility are negatively correlated, then an increase in the minimum retirement age reduces the
fertility rate. This implies that the theoretical result of the paper, i.e. that the reform is ineffective in the long
term, is reinforced if we treat fertility as endogenous. The simulation model can also be extended by introducing
the consumption/leisure decision and, thus, by modifying the intertemporal utility function. However, for all the
four scenarios, simulations results are essentially identical as those presented in the paper. Simulation results are
available from the author upon request.
14According to Eurostat data, the old-age dependency ratio (computed as the ratio between the number of
people aged more than 60 and the number of people aged 20-60) would increase from 0.304 in 2015 to 0.531 in
2050 for the European Union (28 countries).
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sustainable if the population is not stable. Figure 2 shows that the increase in the minimum
retirement age (Scenario 3) permits to reduce pension deficits and thus produces positive effects,
but only in the short and medium run. In contrast, after 35 years, the level of pension deficits
is exactly the same as in the case in which the reform is not introduced. This implies that
the reform becomes ineffective in the long run and, consequently, is not sufficient to face the
population ageing problem.15 The same result is obtained if we assume that the economy is
closed. Figure 3 in Appendix 2 compares Scenario 4 with a scenario in which we simulate the
effects of population ageing, assuming that the economy is closed. As in Figure 2, the increase
in retirement age reduces pension deficits in the short run and is ineffective in the long run.
It is thus possible to conclude that the numerical simulations prove the robustness of the
theoretical result (which is obtained by assuming that the population is stable and the economy
is a small-open economy). In fact, by removing both assumptions, a reform that increases the
minimum retirement age is ineffective in the long run.
4 Conclusions
An increase in the minimum retirement age, which is a reform that may be introduced in order
to face the population ageing problem, induces a permanent and positive effect on the financial
situation of the pension system only if the system is perfectly non-neutral. In contrast, in the
context of a “neutral” pension system such as an NDC system, our paper shows that this kind
of reform produces a positive effect only in the short and medium run. In the long run, this
reform becomes ineffective in the sense that it does not allow to produce surpluses (or to reduce
deficits) with respect to the pre-reform case. In fact, in the case of a “neutral” pension system,
individuals who are obliged to work one or more additional years obtain an increase in pension
benefits (such that the present value of all the expected increases in pension benefits coincides
with the additional contributions paid and the pension benefits lost) and in, the long run, the
increase in the pension expenditure compensates the positive effect of the reform.
The result presented in this paper implies that the strategy implemented by some European
countries like France, Germany and Italy (i.e. the introduction of a reform that increases the
minimum retirement age) is not appropriate given the previous reforms aimed at obtaining a
more neutral pension system. In fact, as shown in this paper both theoretically and numeri-
15Note that pension deficits become equal to zero only when the population becomes stable.
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cally, the increase in the minimum retirement age does not permit to solve the long-run financial
problem related to population ageing in countries where the pension system is sufficiently neu-
tral. Both the theoretical and the numerical results are consistent with the simulations results
presented by the Nucleo di Valutazione della Spesa Previdenziale (Italian Minister of Labor) for
the Italian case. Italy introduced an NDC pension system during the Nineties and a reform that
increased the minimum retirement age in 2004 and 2007. Simulations show that the reduction
in pension deficits, due to the increase in the minimum retirement age, is only transitory and,
thirty years after the introduction of this reform, the positive effect of the reform disappears.
Finally, another negative consequence of the reform is in terms of welfare. In fact, an increase
in the minimum retirement age provokes a reduction in the utility level of those individuals who
are obliged to work more, even if this negative effect is (partially) compensated by the fact that
the increase in the present value of lifetime incomes permits to increase consumption.
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Appendix 1. Computation of the value of the increase in pension benefits due to a post-
ponement of the retirement age by one year.
The term in the LHS of equation 4 can be written in the following way:
τ · ηS+N+1 ·At+1 · w · γS+N+1 + (1 +R) ·
N∑
i=1
τ · ηS+i ·At+i−N · w · (1 +R)N−i · γS+i
The term PS+N+2,t+2 in equation 4 can be decomposed as follows: PS+N+2,t+2 = PS+N+1,t+1+
∆Pt+2, where ∆Pt+2 represents the increase in pension benefits obtained at date t+ 2 due to a
postponement of the retirement age by one year. Thus, the term in the RHS of equation 4 can
be written in the following way:
(PS+N+1,t+1 + ∆Pt+2) ·
N+X∑
i=N+2
(1 +R)N+1−i · γS+i
= PS+N+1,t+1 ·
N+X∑
i=N+2
(1 +R)N+1−i · γS+i + ∆Pt+2 ·
N+X∑
i=N+2
(1 +R)N+1−i · γS+i
= PS+N+1,t+1 · (1 +R) ·
N+X∑
i=N+2
(1 +R)N−i · γS+i + ∆Pt+2 ·
N+X∑
i=N+2
(1 +R)N+1−i · γS+i
By adding and subtracting the term PS+N+1,t+1 · γS+N+1,16 we find:
{
PS+N+1,t+1 · (1 +R) ·
N+X∑
i=N+1
(1 +R)N−i − PS+N+1,t+1 · γS+N+1
}
+
{
∆Pt+2 ·
N+X∑
i=N+2
(1 +R)N+1−i · γS+i
}
Thus, equation 4 becomes:
τ · ηS+N+1 ·At+1 · w · γS+N+1 + (1 +R) ·
N∑
i=1
τ · ηS+i ·At+i−N · w · (1 +R)N−i · γS+i
= PS+N+1,t+1 · (1 +R) ·
N+X∑
i=N+1
(1 +R)N−i − PS+N+1,t+1 · γS+N+1
+ ∆Pt+2 ·
N+X∑
i=N+2
(1 +R)N+1−i · γS+i
16Note that PS+N+1,t+1 · γS+N+1 = PS+N+1,t+1 · (1 +R) · (1 +R)N−(N+1) · γS+N+1.
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Given that, using equation 1, (1 +R) ·∑Ni=1 τ · ηS+i ·At+i−N ·w · (1 +R)N−i · γS+i is equal
to PS+N+1,t+1 · (1 +R) ·
∑N+X
i=N+1(1 +R)
N−i · γS+i, we find that the increase in pension benefits
(∆Pt+2) satisfies the following relation:
τ · ηS+N+1 ·At+1 · w · γS+N+1 + PS+N+1,t+1 · γS+N+1
= ∆Pt+2 ·
N+X∑
i=N+2
(1 +R)N+1−i · γS+i
Thus:
∆Pt+2 =
τ · ηS+N+1 ·At+1 · w · γS+N+1 + PS+N+1,t+1 · γS+N+1∑N+X
i=N+2(1 +R)
N+1−i · γS+i
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Appendix 2. Simulation results using an OLG model
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